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1. Introduction 
Starting with the seminal contributions of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), the public economics literature saw a proliferation 
of empirical research on the determinants of the level of public spending by 
decentralized authorities. One prominent strand of that literature analyses the effect of 
various types of grants from higher levels of government on the decision process at 
the local level, thereby focusing on the (large) impact of grants on local public 
spending and their (small) impact on local taxes (the well-known “flypaper effect”; 
see Hines and Thaler, 1995, for a review). Similarly, the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on the level of taxation and on the overall size of the public sector 
has been an area of extensive debate and scholarly research (see, e.g., Wilson, 1999, 
for a review).  
In contrast, an aspect of local public finance that has received relatively limited 
empirical attention concerns the choice of tax instruments by decentralized 
authorities.1 Nonetheless, local governments generally have more than one revenue 
instrument available – ranging from the choice between, say, tax revenues and user 
fees to the decision to generate tax revenues from different tax bases (e.g., property 
vs. income). Understanding what factors cause local authorities to rely more heavily 
on one instrument versus alternative ones – i.e. the role of economic and political 
forces in determining the observed tax mix – is of interest for two reasons. First, it 
can tell us whether local authorities are using the available tax instruments optimally. 
Second, it can help in the design of an optimal allocation of revenues in the processes 
of decentralization that are underway in several developed and developing countries. 
This paper focuses on the economic and political determinants of the local tax 
mix in Flanders. The municipal level of government in the Flemish region of Belgium 
represents an interesting – or even unique – example of local tax autonomy. In fact, 
Flemish municipalities have a very large number of available tax instruments, ranging 
from surcharges on federal personal income and regional property tax revenues, to 
own taxes on business activities as well as fees and user charges. In fact, over 120 
different local taxes currently exist (see section 3 below). In addition, Flemish local 
governments are virtually free to set tax rates and fee levels, as well as to define tax 
bases, for all purely local taxes (see also Goeminne et al., 2008).2 As a result, there is 
a vast variation in the choice of tax instruments across the Flemish municipalities, as 
well as in the extent to which a given set of tax instruments is used. The municipal 
level of government in Flanders – consisting of about 300 jurisdictions – therefore 
lends itself perfectly to an empirical analysis of the determinants of the observed tax 
mix. 
Following the empirical approach employed by Kenny and Winer (2006) when 
analysing the tax structure in a large sample of countries, we estimate a system of 
reduced-form equations, where the revenue shares of the main local tax instruments 
are used as dependent variables. The available municipal tax instruments are thereby 
                                                 
1  While some evidence exists on the determinants of local governments’ decisions to adopt a ‘new’ 
tax (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2006) or whether to adopt a local property tax (Fiva and Rattso, 2007), 
analyses addressing the choice of the entire local tax mix are, to the best of our knowledge, 
unavailable to date. Explorations of the tax mix at the national level are likewise scant (exceptions 
include Winer and Hettich, 1991; Volkerink and De Haan, 1999; Kenny and Winer, 2006). 
2  For the limited number of surcharge taxes, local governments only set the tax rate. As described in 
section 3 below, the tax base is defined by the higher-level government setting the tax upon which 
the surcharge is levied.   
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grouped into five areas: taxes on income (the municipal surcharge on the federal 
personal income tax), taxes on property (including the surcharge on the regional 
property tax and municipal second-property taxation), taxes on business (including 
taxes on employment of personnel, commercial signs or use of motorised equipment), 
user charges (including waste disposal and fees for public facilities) and other own 
revenues (such as administrative duties). We employ a vector of (the same) 
explanatory variables in each equation, reflecting the idea that the tax mix in each 
jurisdiction – i.e., the relative revenue share of each of the fiscal instruments – is the 
joint outcome of the simultaneous working of economic and political characteristics 
of the jurisdiction. 
Moreover, given that local governments might use their available tax 
instruments strategically and compete with each other either to attract tax base (cf. tax 
competition literature; see Wilson, 1999; Fuest et al., 2005) or to safeguard their 
popularity in front of immobile, yet rational and informed taxpayers (cf. yardstick 
competition literature; Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995), we also test for inter-
municipal dependence in the choice of the tax mix. In the presence of such strategic 
behaviour, municipalities’ tax choices would not be independent of each other 
(Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). 
The empirical analysis – based on a panel dataset on 289 (out of 308) Flemish 
municipalities observed along an eight-year time period (1995-2002) – identifies a 
number of important determinants of the observed tax mix.  For one, we find that the 
size of the main tax bases – per capita income, assessed property values and an index 
of business activity – and the overall size of the budget requirement play a major role 
in determining the choice and relative weight of local tax instruments. Second, and 
somewhat surprisingly, political factors – such as government fragmentation and 
ideological complexion – turn out to play a negligible role. Finally, the analysis 
uncovers virtually no evidence of inter-municipal dependence in the determination of 
the local tax mix. Overall, therefore, it appears that, conditional on the size of the 
local budget, the local tax mix is mainly driven by economic factors rather than 
political ones. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework underlying our empirical analysis.  We build on the tax choice model 
developed by Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988, 1999). Section 3 offers a presentation 
of the institutional structure of local government in Flanders, while sections 4 and 5 
illustrate the empirical approach employed and the results of estimation of the system 
of reduced-form equations respectively. In section 6, we test for inter-jurisdictional 
dependence. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Following Kenny and Winer (2006) and Ashworth et al. (2006), our theoretical 
framework to study local taxation choices and the resulting equilibrium tax mix 
builds on the theory of revenue structures developed by Hettich and Winer (1984, 
1988, 1999). 
Hettich and Winer model taxation as part of a broader political equilibrium in 
which political parties are assumed to maximise their expected votes and have re-
election as their sole objective. Basically, political parties compete for the support of 
a heterogeneous group of voters by choosing a tax structure that minimizes the 
political costs (in terms of electoral support) associated with the different tax sources 
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exploited. The political costs of taxation derive both from the individual’s loss in 
disposable income due to taxation as well as the welfare loss resulting from the costs 
incurred in attempting at avoiding or evading taxation (Hettich and Winer, 1999; 
Kenny and Winer, 2006; Ashworth et al., 2006). 
The basic set-up concerning the determination of the tax mix in a competitive 
political equilibrium is represented in Figure 1, where we consider a very stylized 
situation in which two tax instruments (Tax 1 and Tax 2) are available. 
 
Figure 2: Optimal taxation with two tax instruments 
Benefit 
Cost 
Spending 
 
 
 
The marginal cost curves for each tax (MC1 and MC2) reflect the government’s 
(expected) vote loss relative to a given level of tax revenues derived from levying this 
tax.3 Horizontally summing these marginal cost curves leads to the marginal political 
cost of both taxes (MC), or, in other words, the marginal cost of raising a given level 
of revenue. As usual, the MC curves are upward-sloping, reflecting the idea that 
taxation becomes increasingly electorally costly when the amount of revenue raised 
increases. Each tax is also associated with a marginal political benefit function, the 
vertical summation of which is given by MB (for reasons of clarity, the tax-specific 
MB functions are not drawn). The marginal benefit is downward sloping to indicate 
that increasing amounts of government spending become progressively less desirable 
to the electorate.4   
                                                 
3  The depiction in Figure 1 assumes that marginal political costs are independent across revenue 
sources (see Hettich and Winer, 1984, 70).   
4  Each tax also has an underlying tax rate-revenue relationship (represented by the Laffer curve), 
which, for ease of exposition, is not drawn in Figure 1.   
Revenue
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MC2 
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In equilibrium, the government’s optimal budget size corresponds to the 
expenditure (and tax) level R0. At this level, the marginal political benefits and costs 
of taxation (taking into account costs of administration, monitoring, enforcement and 
tax compliance) are equalized. The implications for the tax structure result from “a 
classic optimisation problem in which the government, for any level of expenditures, 
will adjust the tax rates until the marginal political costs are equalised over the 
different tax instruments” (Ashworth et al., 2006, 227). The result is a tax mix where 
the “marginal costs per dollar of revenue be equalized across tax bases” (Kenny and 
Winer, 2006, 185).  
This model, and its graphical representation in Figure 1, can be employed to 
assess how exogenous changes in the economic and political environment affect the 
level and distribution of revenues across the available tax instruments. In particular, 
the model provides empirical predictions of a twofold nature.   
The first concerns the “absolute” reliance on each of the available tax 
instruments as circumstances change, and is known as the “scale” effect (Kenny and 
Winer, 2006). In particular, the model suggests that all available tax instruments 
should generate higher revenues as total budget size increases.  
The second set of empirical predictions regards how the “relative” reliance on 
available tax instruments (i.e., the share of tax instruments in total tax revenues) 
varies as circumstances change. Following Kenny and Winer (2006), three “effects” 
can here be distinguished: a) tax base, b) political and c) administration cost effects. 
Indeed, by affecting the position and slope of the marginal cost functions depicted in 
Figure 1, these factors influence the degree to which revenues from each tax 
instrument contribute in equilibrium to the funding of local public expenditures. In 
particular, a larger tax base lowers the marginal cost of raising revenues from that tax 
instrument (shifting the MC function in Figure 1 down and to the right), implying 
more intense reliance on that tax instrument at the expense of the other tax 
instruments. A similar movement of the marginal cost function follows from lower 
political and administration costs related to a given tax instrument, implying 
increased reliance on that instrument.  
 
 
3. Local government and taxation in Flanders 
The local level of government in Flanders (and Belgium more generally) is organised 
in much the same way as governments at the regional or federal level in Belgium. 
That is, local governments are designed according to a parliamentary system 
consisting of two main political bodies: the local council (the legislative body or 
‘parliament’) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body or 
‘government’). The number of representatives in each of these two bodies is a direct 
function of the population size of the municipality and varies between 2 to 10 
members for the College and 7 to 55 members for the council. Council members are 
elected directly once every 6 years (and they can be indefinitely re-elected) using a 
system of proportional representation. Following the election, the party (or parties in 
case a coalition needs to be formed) obtaining a majority position in the council 
chooses its council-members that are to be appointed as alderman and mayor.5 As 
                                                 
5  A multi-party College thus generally indicates that no party obtained a clear majority in the council 
(although, in some cases, a party obtaining a majority nonetheless opts for a coalition government). 
This is different from, for example, the Norwegian system where the composition of the College is a 
reflection of the composition of the council (cf. Tovmo, 2007). It implies, moreover, that, with the 
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such, all members of the College are also members of the council and the College can 
be seen as that sub-section of the council that is concerned with the day-to-day 
running of the municipality (and is, like the council, headed by the mayor). Since all 
policy decisions, with few exceptions, are taken by majority vote in the council, it is 
clear that political power at the local level in Flanders lies (nearly) completely with 
those parties forming the majority government (note that minority governments 
hardly ever occur).  
Flemish local governments finance most of their spending via two main revenue 
sources. First, intergovernmental grants constitute on average about 40% of local 
revenues. They are a complicated, though objective function of population size, fiscal 
capacity, indicators of ‘need’ (i.e. share of elderly people), size of green areas and 
whether or not the municipality is considered a ‘pole of attraction’ (for labour and 
education). While some conditional grants are also employed, the majority of grant 
revenue is unconditional. Second, tax revenues constitute approximately 40% of 
revenues on average. These revenues mostly derive from surcharge taxes on the 
regional tax on immovable property (i.e. the local property tax) and on the federal tax 
on labour income (i.e. the local income tax), though numerous purely local taxes are 
also employed (for more details, see below). The remaining 20% of revenues comes 
from a variety of revenue sources such as dividends from municipal cooperations 
(e.g., in the distribution of gas and electricity) and returns on financial investments.  
Important for our analysis, Flemish municipalities nowadays have an extensive 
degree of autonomy with respect to their tax policy (see also Ashworth et al., 2006; 
Goeminne et al., 2008). This, however, was not always the case. In fact, Flemish 
municipalities only obtained the right to generate own fiscal revenue in the mid-1960s 
(when the Law of 31 July 1963 allowed them to set a surcharge on federal income tax 
revenues). However, they could not introduce a surcharge of more than 5% of federal 
income tax revenues (increased to 6% in the law of 7 April 1967). Still, in an effort to 
curb the consequences of the municipal budgetary crisis of the early 1980s, the law of 
11 April 1983 removed this limitation. The same law also extended the possibilities 
for local governments to introduce own local taxes. While both elements were aimed 
at increasing the sense of financial responsibility in municipal officials and induce 
inhabitants to more closely monitor municipal policies, they obviously also extended 
the fiscal autonomy of the local level of government a great deal (for more details on 
these legislative changes, see Van Audenhove, 1990).  
One immediate consequence of the extensive fiscal autonomy given to local 
governments since 1983 is that they obtained a considerable liberty to introduce new 
taxes. In a sense, local governments are now only stopped by their own imagination – 
and interventions by higher-level governments – regarding the nature of taxes they 
introduce. For example, while a tax on the placement of mobile phone transmission 
masts within the municipal boundaries is currently contested, taxes on private 
swimming pools, balconies, transportation of drunken persons, distribution of 
telephone books, dogs, boats, horses and so on are levied by at least one Flemish 
municipality (while a tax on wearing masks has recently become obsolete).  In fact, 
approximately 120 different purely local taxes exist. For such purely local taxes, 
municipalities can set the tax base as well as the tax rate independently and fully 
autonomously (see also Goeminne et al., 2008). 
                                                                                                                                           
noted exception of cases where mathematically superfluous parties are taken up in the ruling 
majority, all parties in the College are important to reach the necessary majority to pass legislation in 
the council. 
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As far as surcharges on higher-level governments’ taxes are concerned, local 
governments can set any tax rate they desire, although the tax base is determined by 
the higher-level government. Specifically, the primary tax base for the local income 
tax is individual taxpayers’ taxable income. From this, via application of the federal 
tax code, federal income tax revenue is calculated. This revenue then forms the 
“secondary” tax base from which, by multiplication with the municipal tax rate, local 
income tax revenue is obtained. In 2002, the local income tax rate (i.e. the level of the 
surcharge) varied between 0% and 9.5%. For the local property tax, it works in much 
the same way, except that the underlying primary tax base equals the assessed net 
rental value of property. By application of the regional property tax code, one obtains 
regional tax revenues. This tax revenue is the secondary tax base, upon which the 
municipalities can apply their own local tax rate. In 2002, the local property tax rate 
lay between 550% and 2250% (such that the bulk of property tax revenues goes to 
local governments).6 
Another result of the considerable local fiscal autonomy concerns the wide 
diversity in the use of various tax sources. Clearly, not all municipalities use all 
available tax instruments. Nonetheless, although on average approximately 80 percent 
of local tax revenues derives from surcharges on the federal income and the regional 
property tax, the average municipality levies no less than 17 different purely local 
taxes (out of the 120 currently in use). For instance, some municipalities do not use 
the surcharge on the federal income tax at all (whereas on average this is the most 
important tax revenue source for the Flemish municipalities; see below) while others 
rely almost exclusively on surcharge taxes. 
This diversity is illustrated in more detail in Table 1, where we present 
summary statistics concerning the revenue shares of available tax instruments after 
having grouped these into five areas: taxes on income (the municipal surcharge on the 
federal personal income tax), taxes on property (including the surcharge on the 
regional property tax and municipal property taxation), taxes on business (including 
taxes on employment of personnel, commercial signs and use of motorised 
equipment), user charges (including waste disposal and fees for use of public 
facilities) and other own revenues (such as administrative duties). These revenue 
shares are the main dependent variables in the later analysis.  
 
Table 1: Tax revenue shares – summary statistics (N=290; period 1995-2002) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 overall 
Income 44.73 
(11.08) 
44.07 
(10.80) 
44.02 
(10.67)
44.25 
(10.78)
44.97 
(10.83)
45.92 
(11.04)
45.99 
(11.25) 
45.41 
(10.97) 
44.92 
(10.93)
Property 39.49 
(8.97) 
39.87 
(8.79) 
40.09 
(8.73) 
40.30 
(8.82) 
39.52 
(9.04) 
39.31 
(9.09) 
38.92 
(8.92) 
39.95 
(8.67) 
39.68 
(8.88) 
Business 2.63 
(4.53) 
2.62 
(4.48) 
2.46 
(4.45) 
2.50 
(4.39) 
2.47 
(4.41) 
2.43 
(4.41) 
2.55 
(4.75) 
2.65 
(4.80) 
2.54 
(4.52) 
Fees 8.39 
(4.82) 
8.73 
(4.90) 
8.47 
(4.79) 
8.33 
(4.64) 
8.10 
(4.49) 
7.91 
(4.41) 
7.82 
(4.44) 
7.45 
(4.39) 
8.15 
(4.62) 
Note: Numbers are averages across all municipalities; standard deviation between brackets. 
 
It is immediately apparent from Table 1 that income and property taxes are, on 
average, the most prominent revenue sources. Fees are the third-largest group, but, 
                                                 
6 For further details, see Ashworth and Heyndels (2001).  
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somewhat surprisingly in the light of what can be observed in other Western 
countries, have lost some importance over the period analysed. 
 
 
4. Empirical model and methodology 
The theoretical model in section 2 generates a number of empirical predictions 
regarding both the absolute use of different tax sources depending on the total budget 
requirement (i.e. the scale effect), as well as the relative use of tax instruments as a 
function of the size of the tax bases and political and administration costs. Clearly, 
however, the empirical approach required to assess those effects differs.   
First, for scale effects, we need to test whether all available tax instruments 
generate more revenues as the total size of the budget increases. In order to do so, we 
estimate a system of (five) equations that have total (real) revenues in jurisdiction i 
and year t from each tax base k (ritk, with k=income, property, business, user charges, 
and other) as a percentage of total income of the jurisdiction (yit) as the dependent 
variable. The set of explanatory variables includes the total municipal budget 
(rit=Σkritk) as a percentage of total income of the jurisdiction, as well as a number of 
controls capturing the socio-economic complexion of the jurisdiction: 
 
(ritk / yit) = γk(rit / yit) + xit′βk + fik + htk + εitk     (1) 
 
where, for each tax instrument equation, fik is a fixed jurisdiction specific effect, htk is 
a fixed time effect, and εitk is a random term. 
Second, although an increase in the total size of the budget is expected to result 
in an absolute increase in revenue drawn from each revenue source, the competitive 
political system framework outlined above also suggests that the relative reliance on 
any given tax base will differ depending on the relative shapes of the political cost 
functions. Hence, the empirical analysis needs to investigate to what extent the 
relative importance of different tax instruments depends on observable exogenous 
variables that proxy tax base, political and administration cost effects. Therefore, we 
estimate a system of equations where the share of revenues from each tax source (ritk / 
rit) is the dependent variable, and include a number of proxies for base, political and 
administration cost effects as independent variables: 
 
(ritk / rit) = φkrit  + xit′δk + gik + mtk + νitk     (2) 
 
where, for each tax instrument, gik and mtk represent jurisdiction and time specific 
fixed effects. Vector xit includes the following variables as proxies for base, political 
and administration cost effects. 
First, in order to capture the size of tax bases, xit includes per capita income, per 
capita assessed net rental value of property, and the number of firms per inhabitant. 
These variables represent proxies for the size of income, property and business tax 
revenue potential respectively.  
Second, a number of socio-demographic characteristics of the jurisdiction – 
population size, population density, the degree of income inequality (ratio of 
interquartile difference in income to the median value), the rate of unemployment, 
and the share of elderly people (population over 65 as a percentage of total 
population) – are included to capture the traits of a jurisdiction that are commonly 
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expected to affect the political and administrative costs of raising revenues through 
different tax sources. 
Finally, four political variables are included in the model. First, a measure of the 
government’s ideology is included to examine whether parties’ political persuasion – 
and the potential difference in perceived political costs of different types of taxes – 
affects the local tax mix. We measure the ideological complexion of the local 
government as , where pi is the seat share of party i in the 
College of Mayor and Aldermen and ‘Complexion’ refers to the ideological position 
of this party on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10).
∑=ni ii Complexionp1 ).(
7 Second, we account for potential 
policy effects from the number of parties in the local government. This variable is 
included as recent evidence has shown that the size of local government coalitions (in 
terms of the number of parties) often significantly affects government decision-
making in Flemish municipalities (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2005, 2006; Geys, 2007; 
Goeminne et al., 2008; Werck et al., 2008). Third, an indicator of voter turnout – 
measured as the number of valid votes cast as a share of the total eligible population – 
is introduced to capture the degree of control of the electorate on governments’ 
choices. 
Finally, the share of females in the executive body of the municipality is 
included. This follows a number of recent studies indicating that gender is an 
important indicator of policy preferences (e.g., Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and 
Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008) and that female representation often 
significantly affects policy outcomes (e.g., Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 
2004; Svaleryd, 2007). All previous work on this issue, however, looks at the effect 
of female representation on the size of the public sector or the composition of public 
spending. This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, assessing the role of 
female representation on the revenue side of the budget. 
 
 
5. Results 
The results of estimating the system of equations (1) – addressing the “scale effect” 
hypothesised in the theoretical model – are reported in Table 2. For each equation, all 
variables are taken as deviations from the group (municipality) means in order to get 
rid of the fixed jurisdiction effect, thus leading to a standard within-groups estimator. 
In the upper panel of Table 2, only time effects and total revenue as a share of local 
income are included as explanatory variables, while the results in the lower panel are 
based on a specification of the system of equations (1) that also includes a number of 
additional controls (as discussed above). However, to preserve space and since the 
focus here is on the effect that the size of government has on the absolute use of 
available revenue sources, the effects of the other variables are not reported (results 
available upon request). 
 
 
                                                 
7  The data concerning a party’s ideological position were obtained from Deschouwer (1996) and 
Rihoux (2001).  They are based on a self-placement survey asking presidents and spokesmen of the 
parties in the municipalities to locate their party on an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 
(Right).  The figures range from 2.6 (the Green party) to 6.1 (the Liberal party) (the extreme-right-
wing party Vlaams Blok – now Vlaams Belang – was not represented in any local government and is 
therefore not in the dataset). 
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Table 2: Tax instrument absolute reliance: system (1) 
 income property business user fees other 
Total revenue 0.123 (21.77) 
0.451 
(50.19) 
0.075 
(17.42) 
0.077 
(13.34) 
0.274 
(28.41) 
Municipality effects Yes yes yes Yes yes 
Time effects Yes yes yes Yes yes 
Other controls No no no No no 
R2 0.50 0.57 0.13 0.10 0.26 
Observations 
(units) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
      
 income property business user fees other 
Total revenue 0.130 (23.01) 
0.427 
(48.38) 
0.074 
(16.68) 
0.079 
(13.36) 
0.289  
(29.32) 
Municipality effects Yes yes yes Yes yes 
Time effects Yes yes yes Yes yes 
Other controls Yes yes yes Yes yes 
R2 0.53 0.61 0.14 0.12 0.28 
Observations 
(units) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; controls: population, population density, property value, number of 
firms per inhabitant, income, income inequality, unemployment, % old, fragmentation, ideology, 
turnout, female representation in the executive. 
 
 
A first observation from Table 2 is that the inclusion of additional control 
variables has little effect on our main findings. Indeed, the results are very similar in 
the two specifications. Secondly, we find that total revenue as a percentage of a 
jurisdictions’ income has a positive and significant impact on all five sources of 
revenue. This result lends support to the scale effect hypothesis, according to which, 
as government gets larger, more revenues are obtained from each tax source. 
Nonetheless, a third finding is that the strength of this scale effect varies considerably 
across the available revenue sources. In particular, and given that the sum of the 
coefficients across the five equations is equal to 1, property tax revenues are 
estimated to respond in a relatively elastic way to increases in the budget requirement, 
with a coefficient of almost 0.5. The response of business taxes and user charges to 
changes in the size of the budget is, on the other hand, close to zero. The elasticity of 
income tax revenues to budget expansions is also quite low (just above 0.1).  Hence, 
our results suggest that property taxes as well as “other” sources of revenues (which 
have a coefficient of almost 0.3) are a preferred source of revenues by Flemish local 
governments in need of extra funds. Business and income tax revenues (which are 
levied on more mobile tax bases) appear much less elastic. 
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One potential explanation of the above result is that Flemish local governments 
are aware of the fact that it is generally more difficult to extract resources from 
mobile tax bases in a competitive environment. Indeed, property taxes (which are 
levied on immobile capital) react elastically, while business and income tax revenues 
(which are levied on more mobile tax bases) appear much less elastic. This is in line 
with a large tax competition literature showing that tax burdens tend to be shifted 
towards less mobile tax bases (e.g., Gordon, 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; see 
Eggert and Haufler, 1999, for a review).  A second explanation lies in the fact that the 
local income tax is residence based, while the property tax is source based. As a 
result, tax exportation may occur for the property tax since the tax payer (i.e. the 
house owner) need not necessarily live in the municipality where the house stands 
(see also Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006).  This is likely to lower that political cost of 
that tax.    
Tables 3 and 4 turn to the within-groups estimation of the system of equations 
(2). The share of each tax source in total local government revenues is the dependent 
variable here. Note that, given that we employ deviations from group means and that 
the five tax shares necessarily sum to one, the sum of the coefficients on each variable 
across the five tax instruments must equal zero. Table 3 presents the results from a 
specification that only includes the economic and socio-demographic characteristics 
of the jurisdiction, while table 4 adds the political variables. 
In discussing the results, we go over the main findings for each tax source 
separately. Still, before we go into the details, it can be observed from a comparison 
of tables 3 and 4 that a jurisdiction’s economic and financial characteristics tend to 
have a significant impact on the observed tax mix that is very similar in the two 
specifications, while the political variables at the bottom of Table 4 have a much 
more diverse (and generally statistically weaker) effect. 
Turning to a more detailed look at the results, we first of all find that the size of 
the tax bases turns out to be the most important determinant of the share of revenues 
from income, property and business taxes. In particular, the share of the income tax 
rises with its tax base (per capita income), while it is negatively correlated with the 
property and business tax bases. Moreover, the income tax share decreases with the 
overall size of the budget (confirming the “scale effect” findings in Table 2), the size 
of population, the percentage of elderly residents, and the degree of income 
inequality. The latter effect might be due to the limited redistributive impact of local 
income taxation due to the absence of any additional progressive elements in the local 
income tax system.  
As far as the political variables in Table 4 are concerned, they have no 
significant effect on the share of income tax revenues in total local government tax 
revenues, except the proportion of females in the executive body. A higher share of 
female representatives is related to a higher reliance on both income and property 
taxes, mainly at the expense of “other” revenues such as administrative duties. One 
potential explanation is that women tend to be more egalitarian and socially conscious 
(cf. Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008). 
Hence, they may be more likely to see the provision of local services as basic 
necessities which should be ‘free’ (i.e. paid for from general tax revenues received 
through income and property taxes) while also being in favour of higher tax burdens 
on high-income earners and property owners. 
The share of the property tax is strongly positively affected by the property tax 
base and the size of government (once again confirming the “scale effect” findings in 
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Table 2). In addition, population density and the proportion of elderly people are 
estimated to exert a positive effect on the property tax share. This makes sense given 
that higher population density involves more housing, and older people are more 
likely to own their own house. 
 
Table 3: Tax instrument relative reliance:  
System (2), economic determinants 
 income property business user fees other 
Total own revenues -0.050 (9.83) 
0.012 
(2.35) 
0.002 
(0.73) 
-0.006 
(1.36) 
0.042 
(7.82) 
Income tax base 0.937 (4.05) 
-0.370 
(1.60) 
-0.198 
(1.66) 
-0.334 
(1.77) 
-0.035 
(0.14) 
Property tax base -0.017 (6.15) 
0.030 
(10.50) 
-0.005 
(3.15) 
-0.005 
(2.10) 
-0.003 
(0.93) 
Business tax base -41.898 (3.46) 
-0.851 
(0.07) 
27.478 
(4.40) 
5.880 
(0.60) 
9.391 
(0.74) 
Population (,000) -0.518 (3.02) 
0.184 
(1.08) 
-0.115 
(1.30) 
0.264 
(1.89) 
0.184 
(1.02) 
Population density 0.013 (1.65) 
0.018 
(2.19) 
-0.001 
(0.23) 
-0.026 
(3.94) 
-0.004 
(0.47) 
Income inequality -0.032 (3.04) 
0.011 
(1.09) 
0.011 
(2.10) 
0.006 
(0.74) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
Unemployment -15.256 (0.93) 
-2.450 
(0.15) 
-14.432 
(1.71) 
9.190 
(0.69) 
22.948 
(1.34) 
Old -26.271 (1.93) 
58.548 
(4.32) 
-6.038 
(0.86) 
-18.234 
(1.64) 
-8.006 
(0.56) 
Fragmentation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Ideology 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Turnout 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Female 
representation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Municipality effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.03 
Observations   
(units) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Tax instrument relative reliance:  
System (2), economic & political determinants 
 income property business charges other 
Total own revenues -0.050 (9.88) 
0.012 
(2.30) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
-0.005 
(1.28) 
0.041 
(7.94) 
Income tax base 0.890 (3.84) 
-0.377 
(1.63) 
-0.209 
(1.74) 
-0.303 
(1.60) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
Property tax base -0.017 (6.07) 
0.029 
(10.35) 
-0.004 
(3.05) 
-0.005 
(2.05) 
-0.003 
(0.93) 
Business tax base -41.103 (3.39) 
-0.640 
(0.05) 
26.552 
(4.25) 
4.805 
(0.49) 
10.387 
(0.82) 
Population (,000) -0.507 (2.95) 
0.138 
(0.81) 
-0.124 
(1.40) 
0.285 
(2.03) 
0.208 
(1.16) 
Population density 0.014 (1.73) 
0.020 
(2.55) 
-0.001 
(0.36) 
-0.026 
(4.00) 
-0.007  
(0.77) 
Income inequality -0.032 (2.99) 
0.017 
(1.66) 
0.010 
(1.86) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
Unemployment -16.273 (0.98) 
-1.035 
(0.06) 
-10.277 
(1.20) 
3.190 
(0.24) 
24.394 
(1.41) 
Old -27.430 (2.02) 
58.301 
(4.32) 
-6.246 
(0.89) 
-17.565 
(1.58) 
-7.060 
(0.50) 
Index of fragmentation 
(number of parties) 
-0.054 
(0.32) 
0.575 
(3.47) 
-0.194 
(2.27) 
-0.047 
(0.34) 
-0.280 
(1.61) 
Index of executive ideology 
(0 (left) to 10 (right) scale) 
-0.023 
(0.13) 
-0.267 
(1.47) 
-0.037 
(0.39) 
-0.178 
(1.19) 
0.506      
(2.64) 
Voter turnout 7.413 (0.52) 
-15.876 
(1.12) 
-22.422 
(3.04) 
26.554 
(2.27) 
4.331 
(0.29) 
Female representation 1.856 (3.20) 
2.100 
(3.64) 
-0.798 
(2.67) 
-0.574 
(1.21) 
-2.584 
(4.25) 
Municipality effects yes yes yes yes Yes 
Time effects yes yes yes yes Yes 
R2 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.04 
Observations                
(units) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. 
 
There is also a positive effect of government fragmentation, suggesting that 
more fragmented governments rely to a larger extent on property taxation.8  
                                                 
8  A potential explanation here lies in the fact the government fragmentation is often associated with 
indecision and gridlock (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Boix, 1997; Ashworth et al., 2005). In such a 
setting, it may be easier to agree upon taxing politically less costly tax bases (such as immobile 
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The relative reliance on business taxes and user charges is almost unrelated with 
the total size of the budget (once again confirming the “scale effect” findings in Table 
2). More generally, the explanatory power of the model for these two revenue sources 
remains rather weak. Nonetheless, for business taxation, the results suggest that 
reliance on this revenue source increases with the size of the tax base (in terms of the 
number of firms) and income inequality (which can be related to the stronger demand 
for redistribution and decreased reliance on proportional income taxation in that 
setting; see above). It decreases with voter turnout and female representation in the 
executive. In each case, however, the substantive as well as statistical importance is 
relatively weak. 
Finally, the rest category (including administrative duties) is strongly positively 
associated with the total size of the budget. This suggests that ‘free’ administrative 
services become less pervasive in situations where budget requirements become more 
stringent. The other variables have little explanatory power in this equation, although 
there is some (relatively weak) evidence that more left-wing oriented governments 
and those that have a higher representation of women are less likely to charge more 
extensive administrative duties. As mentioned above, this may derive from the fact 
that, like left-wing parties, women tend to be more egalitarian (cf. Lott and Kenny, 
1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008) and want such basic 
administrative services to be ‘free’ (i.e. paid for from general tax revenues received 
through income and property taxes). 
Overall, we find that a predominant role in determining the local tax mix is 
played by the respective tax base sizes. More generally, it appears that economic 
variables – such as the tax base – are far more important to explain variations in the 
local tax mix than political variables. Indeed, although we employ political variables 
that are ‘standard’ in estimations of public policy equations, they play virtually no 
role in explaining the local tax mix. Interestingly, the single exception appears to be 
the share of female council-members. The significant effects of female representation 
on the local tax mix support previous work illustrating its effect on the composition 
of public spending (e.g., Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Svaleryd, 
2007). 
 
 
6. Testing for inter-jurisdictional dependence 
Since the presence of five tax instruments makes estimation of an inter-municipal 
fiscal reaction function hardly feasible, we search for evidence of interaction among 
municipal fiscal choices by testing for spatial auto-correlation in the residuals from 
the system of reduced-form share equations (2). The presence of significant spatial 
auto-correlation in those residuals represents evidence that, after controlling for the 
internal economic and political determinants, the tax mix choice in one jurisdiction is 
not independent of the choices in other jurisdictions, and might be compatible with a 
process of competition. Moreover, an indirect test of the nature of the competitive 
forces driving the spatial pattern relies on the extent to which evidence of inter-
municipal dependence varies with the degree of mobility of the tax base, with 
business-related tax bases being arguably more mobile than property-related ones. 
                                                                                                                                           
capital). This interpretation is also consistent with the negative effect of this variable on the share of 
business taxation. 
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Table 5 reports the results of computing the Moran statistic of spatial auto-
correlation on the raw tax shares in order to have a preliminary picture of the extent to 
which spatial auto-correlation is an issue in the Flemish system of local government.9 
Letting Δstk be the (289×1) vector of deviations from the regional mean of tax share k 
in year t, the Moran statistic is computed as: 
 
Mtk(s) = (Δstk′ WΔstk)/(Δstk′ Δstk)      (3) 
 
where W is a (289×289) weights matrix that contains the information on the location 
of municipalities. In particular, we use a binary, contiguity-based and row-
standardised matrix, meaning that the (i,j) element of W equals 1/ni if municipalities i 
and j share a border, with ni the number of bordering municipalities of municipality i, 
and 0 otherwise. The Moran statistic is asymptotically normally distributed (Anselin, 
1988). Table 5 reports both the values taken by the Moran statistic in each of the eight 
years and the one based on the eight-year average. The results show that all tax shares 
– except “other” sources of revenue – are highly positively correlated. The non-
findings for this “other”-category, however, most likely derives from the wide variety 
of tax revenue sources in this group. 
 
Table 5: Moran test on raw tax shares 
 income property business charges other 
1995 0.353** 0.316** 0.211** 0.134** 0.081 
1996 0.332** 0.303** 0.193** 0.147** 0.039 
1997 0.334** 0.298** 0.191** 0.139** 0.024 
1998 0.326** 0.300** 0.186** 0.131** 0.033 
1999 0.322** 0.289** 0.189** 0.131** 0.030 
2000 0.336** 0.290** 0.150** 0.132** 0.029 
2001 0.341** 0.272** 0.122** 0.158** 0.047 
2002 0.343** 0.340** 0.149** 0.132** 0.021 
Average 1995-2002 0.351** 0.317** 0.189** 0.155** 0.061 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 
Note: *, ** significant at 5%, 1%. 
 
Still, the results in Table 5 cannot be directly interpreted as evidence in favour 
of inter-jurisdictional dependence. Clearly, contiguous municipalities may have 
similar socio-economic characteristics. To the extent that this influences their tax 
choice (which we have shown to be the case in Tables 3 and 4), the strong inter-
municipal correlation in the tax mix observed in Table 5 may simply result from 
failing to control for socio-economic similarities between neighbouring 
                                                 
9 Previous work suggests significant spatial auto-correlation in the setting of local income and 
property tax rates in Flanders (e.g., Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Richard et al., 2005; Van Parys 
and Verbeke, 2007; Goeminne, 2008). Geys (2006) also provides evidence of spatial auto-
correlation in Flemish local government efficiency ratings (see Revelli and Tovmo, 2007, for a 
similar finding using Norwegian data). 
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municipalities.  Hence, we compute the Moran statistic on the residuals from system 
(2) including all control variables: 
 
Mtk(ν) = (νtk′ Wνtk)/(νtk′ νtk)       (4) 
 
The results are reported in Table 6, once again depicting both the values taken 
by the Moran statistic in each of the eight years and the ones based on the eight-year 
average. 
 
Table 6: Moran test on the residuals from system (2) 
 income property business charges other 
1995 0.052 -0.021 -0.105* 0.010 -0.001 
1996 -0.039 0.105* -0.079 0.093* -0.099* 
1997 0.003 -0.004 -0.028 0.048 -0.018 
1998 0.022 -0.025 -0.002 -0.030 0.002 
1999 0.029 0.047 0.032 0.039 -0.021 
2000 0.048 0.061 -0.063 -0.014 -0.014 
2001 0.035 0.042 -0.080 0.074 0.017 
2002 -0.062 0.077 -0.069 0.015 0.046 
Average 1995-2002 0.033 0.040 0.057 0.016 -0.054 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 
Note: *, ** significant at 5%, 1%. 
 
Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to the results in Table 5, the analysis on the 
residuals from the system of equations (2) uncovers virtually no evidence of inter-
municipal dependence in the determination of the local tax mix. In fact, only four of 
the cells Table 6 are statistically significant at the 5% level (three of which are 
clustered in 1996). This indicates that, after controlling for the observable 
determinants of the tax shares, the residuals are no longer spatially auto-correlated. 
We can then conclude that the inter-municipal correlation observed in Table 5 derives 
from the fact that contiguous municipalities have similar socio-economic structures 
influencing their tax mix choices in similar directions. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and discussion 
This paper investigated the economic and political determinants of the local tax mix 
in the Flemish region of Belgium, where local governments enjoy extensive fiscal 
autonomy and have a wide variety of available tax instruments. Specifically, using 
panel data of 289 Flemish municipalities over the period 1995-2002, we have 
estimated a system of five reduced-form tax revenue-share equations corresponding 
to income, property, business, user fees and other own revenues. This makes it, to the 
best of our knowledge, the first empirical investigation into the determinants of the 
local tax mix. 
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Our analysis points to a number of important economic determinants of the 
observed tax mix. Indeed, the two most powerful determinants of the local tax mix 
are the overall size of the revenue requirement and the sizes of the respective tax 
bases (income, property and business). Other socio-economic characteristics of the 
municipality – such as the demographic composition, income distribution or 
population density – likewise affect the tax mix by strengthening the local 
government’s reliance on certain types of taxation. On the other hand, political 
variables capturing the strength, ideology and composition of the local executive turn 
out to play a negligible role in the determination of the local tax mix. These results 
taken together suggest that the tax mix chosen by Flemish local governments is 
strongly reflecting the needs and socio-economic characteristics of the municipality, 
and is hardly affected by potential (short-term) political biases. Interestingly, 
however, and in line with recent studies demonstrating the importance of female 
representation on the composition of public spending (e.g., Pande, 2003; 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Svaleryd, 2007), we also show that the share of 
female council-members significantly affects the chosen tax mix in a more 
redistributive direction. 
Finally, the municipal tax share data exhibit an impressive degree of positive 
spatial auto-correlation that could be compatible with a process of inter-municipal 
competition. However, the analysis uncovers virtually no evidence of residual spatial 
dependence in the determination of the local tax mix after controlling for the internal 
determinants of the tax share variables.  Hence, the observed spatial pattern is driven 
almost entirely by the fact that contiguous municipalities have similar socio-economic 
structures influencing their tax mix choices in similar directions. 
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